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June 17, 1982
List 1, Sheet
No. 81-6633
BEARDEN

Cert to Ga Ct App (Quillian,
McMurray, Pope)

v.
STATE OF GEORGIA

State/Criminal

Timely

[In my preliminary memorandum in this case, I mistakenly indicated that no response had been received.

A response

was received and distributed after the petn was distributed.]
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTIONS:

The State responds that the

revocation of petr's probation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Wealth has not generally been held to be a

"-- s+~Ll ~) ~ ~ · ~

-

suspect classification.

~

-

The Court has invalidated several

state laws which interefered with the rights of indigents to
obtain review of their convictions, see, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351

u.s.

12 (1956), but regardless of the level of

scrutiny applied in those cases, only the rationality test
should be applied to probation revocation decisions.

That

lesser level of scrutiny was applied in Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971) and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
The State next asserts that revocation of probation for
failure to pay fines or to make restitution is rational.

If

it is rational to consider financial ability when making the
decision to grant probation, it is also rational to consider
it in the decision to revoke probation.

As a convicted bur-

glar with a new burglary charge pending, petr was no longer a
good probation risk when he lost his job and his ability to
make the required payments.

The principles of Williams and

Tate are not contrary.
The State acknowledges that there is a conflict among
the lower courts on this issue and that "[a]t some point this
conflict should be resolved."
DISCUSSION:

The response makes it clear that petr's

probation was revoked because of his failure to make the required payments.

In light of the conflict acknowledged by the

State, and the dissenting opinions in Woods v. Georgia, 450

u.s.

261 (1981), I recommend that the Court grant the petn.
There is a response.

June 11, 1982

Holzhauer

Opn in petn

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 17, 1982 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 81-6633
Cert to Ga Ct App (Quillian,
McMurray, Pope)

BEARDEN

v.
STATE OF GEORGIA
SUMMARY:

Timely

State/Criminal
Petr contends that the Equal Protection

Clause prohi_bi ts revocation of probation when an indigent is
unable to pay a fine or make restitution.
,7

FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW:

Petr pleaded guilty in Octo-

ber, 1980, to burglary and stolen property charges.

As a

I

first offender, he~as

on

the sloen property charge, and three years probation for the
burglary.

As a

condition of his probation he was required to

pay a fine of $500 and restitution totalling $250.

The pay-

ments were to be made in installments, the last due in February, 1981.

In May, 1981, the state moved to revoke patr's

probation on the grounds that he had committed another burglary, failed to report to his probation officer as directed
and failed to pay $550 of his fine and restitution.

The trial

court revoked the probation and sentenced him to five years
imprisonment, relyingfJri tirely on petr's failure to make the
required payments and to report to his probation officer.

See

Order, reprinted in petn at 60-61.
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.

The court as-

sumed for purposes of appeal that the revocation for failure
to report to the probation officer was erroneous bacause petr
was not notified of that ground for revocation prior to his
hearing.

(The petition for revocation, reprinted in petn at

2-3, does not mention failure to report.)

However the court

held that the failure to make the payments required as a condition of probation provided a separate basis for revocation.
The court rejected petr's equal protection claim, relying on
two state cases but noting the contrary implication of Justice
White's dissent in Woods v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 284-287
(1981).

The Georgia Supreme Court denied cert.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr asserts that the Ga Ct App decision

conflicts with a decision of CAS, Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d

,.

~

-

~

-

550 (CAS 1q77), vacated as moot, 439

u.s.

1041 (1978).

The

same issue was left unresolved in Wood v. Georgia, supra.

The

Court decided the case on other grounds after granting the
petn on the issue raised here.

Justices Brennan, White and

Marshall would have reached the equal protection issue and
would have held that revocation was impermissible.

The state

court decision conflicts with the principles of several decisions of this Court.

See Tate v. Short, 401

Williams v. Illinois, 399
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

u.s.

235

(1970)~

u.s.

395 (1971)

~

Griffin v. Illi-

It violates the Equal Protection

Clause to imprison an indigent for his inability to pay a
fine.
DISCUSSION:

I recommend calling for a response.

This

case does present the issue left unresolved in Wood v. Geor~,

but with a few new wrinkles.

Restitution is involved

here in addition to a fine, and there may be other grounds for
revocation.

No mention is made in the petn or the opinions /

below as to what happened to petr's second burglary charge.

~

I recommend CFR.
June 10, 1982

Holzhauer

Opn in petn
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

January 10, 1983

From: Rives

No. 81-6333, Bearden v. Georgia

Question Presented
The issue is whether the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the revocation of an indigent defendant's probation
for his failure to pay a fine to the state and restitution to
the victims of his crime.

2.

I.

Background
In October 1980, petr pled guilty to separate counts

-

of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property.

Under the

~ ....,.,~.,. IZ;;yr~~-

Georgia first offender statute, the trial court did not. ente

a

-1

judgment against petr.

Instead, it deferred further

proceedings and placed petr on probation, conditioned on
payment of a fine and restitution.

With respect to the charge

of burglary, petr was placed on probation for three years,
conditioned on payment of a fine of $500 and restitution of
$50.

With respect to the charge of theft by receiving stolen

property, he was placed on probation for a period of one year,
...c:;;...

conditioned on payment of $200 restitution.

He was required to

pay $200 immediately, the balance of §550 to be paid within
four months.
When petr was sentenced in October, he was employed
by Rockwell International.

He borrowed the initial payment of

$200 from his parents, who are also poor.

His father is a

retired, disabled veteran and his mother stays home to take
care of her husband.

One month later, in November 1980, petr

was laid off from his job.

Petr sought other work in the

community but could not obtain it.

When the time to pay the

balance of the fines and restitution arrived in February 1981,
petr lacked the money to pay.

He notified the probation

officer that he lacked t:~o&ey~t ~ying to get the
money up.

Petr was

not ;r _~ged

then for violating his

probation.

In May 1981, petr was arrested for committing a

burglary.

The state moved to revoke his probation, both for

~

~

_,

.

committing the burglary and for failing to pay his fine and
restitution.
At a hearing on the state's motion, the state
abandoned the burglary charge as a ground for revocation--a
charge of which petr later was acquitted.

The state, however,

contended that petr had failed to meet with his probation
officer as required and had failed to pay his fine and
restitution.

The trial court agreed and found that it was

required to revoke probation under the previous court order:
"I'm well aware of the indigency provision, and I
know that there are times when a person doesn't have
funds that he's supposed to have, but in any event,
the Court finds that this defendant has failed to
abide by the previous order of this Court ..• in
failing to pay the amount ordered to be paid •..• " JA
at 45.
On appeal, the state court found that the state had
failed to provide petr with notice that it would revoke his
probation for failing to meet with his probation officer.
Accordingly, this ground could not be relied on to uphold the
trial court's order.

The court determined, however, that the

petr's failure to pay was sufficient reason to revoke
probation.

It accepted petr's contention that he was unable to

pay, but rejected his claim that the constitution prevented the
state from discriminating on the ground of indigency.

II. Contentions
A.

Petr contends that strict scrutiny is appropriate when the

state has deprived indigents completely of fundamental or basic
rights.

Here, petr has been denied his liberty because of his

4.

indigency.

Moreover, because the sentence was not entered

until his probation was revoked, Georgia's classification on
the basis of wealth deprived him of the fundamental right to
vote.

Accordingly, the validity of the statute is to be judged

under strict scrutiny.

Alternatively, petr contends that even

if the statute is judged under a rational relation test, it
will fail.

In providing for a fine, the state's purpose is to

determine whether the probationer may be rehabilitated.
revoking the

~enever

By

a probationer cannot pay, as

indigents cannot, the state in effect has made a judgment that
the poor may not be rehabilitated.
assumption.

This is an irrational

The same irrational assumption was rejected in

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and should be rejected
here.

B.

Resp's contentions
Resp contends that the proper standard of review is

to determine whether there is a rational relationship between
the legislature's purposes and the means the state has used to
accomplish them.

The state is seeking to protect !E ree

~.:_:: ~· (! i_r_~9
the probationer.

the state has an interest in rehabilitating

The legislature rationally could have

determined that when a probationer is unable to pay the fines
and restitution on which his probation is conditioned, he is no
longer a likely candidate for rehabilitation.

There are

numerous studies that show that there is a strong empirical
link between criminal activity and poverty.

Further, it is

,,

). /

5.

well accepted that a judge may take a defendant's financial
status into account when he decides whether probation is
appropriate in the first place.

There is no reason why he

should not be able to take it into account when he decides
whether probation should be revoked.
Second, the state has an interest "in protecting

==::::::

society by maintaining public confidence in Georgia's criminal
justice system."

Red Brief at 22.

If petr could escape

punishment because of his indigency, then the public would have
little confidence that its criminal justice system is imposing
punishment equally.
F ~ ly,

the state's policies favoring restitution

also are served by revoking petr's probation for his failure to
pay.

The trial judge may have granted the probation initially

because he thought petr would be able to repair the injury done
to the victims of his crime.

Once petr demonstrated that he

could not pay the victims, this reason for placing him on
probation was removed.

III.

Discussion

The Court
bear on this area.

pre~iously

has

considered~hat

In Griffin v. Illinois, 351

u.s.

12 (1956),

the Court found invalid a state statute that conditioned a
criminal defendant's right to appeal on his ability to pay for
a transcript of the trial proceedings.

It reasoned, "In

criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of
poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.

Plainly

6.

the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not
be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."
Id., at

17-18. ~

In ¥J illiams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), the
Court extended the "teaching" of Griffin to classifications
based on wealth that affected sentencing.
Williams had been convicted of petty theft.

The appellant in
Under the Illinois

statute, the maximum sentence allowed was a year's imprisonment
and a $500 fine.

After having served the maximum time in jail,

the appellant, who was indigent, was unable to pay the fine.
According to Illinois law, he was to be kept in jail to "work
off" his fine and court costs at the rate of $5.00 per day.
The Court found that the statute "worked an invidious
discrimination" against indigents in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.

It reasoned that "once the State has

defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy
...,____._._____ ~

its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject
a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of

_______

imprisonment _____,
beyond the maximum solely by reason of their
~

indigency."

Id., at 241-242.

The Court noted that its holding did not forbid a
court from confining an indigent to "work out" a fine as long
as he is not incarcerated longer than the statutory maximum.
It also expressly reserved the question of whether a
<:.-

- ~

legislature may provide alternate penalties of 30 days or $30,
holding "only that a State may not constitutionally imprison

'

,,.

'

7.

beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is
financially unable to pay a fine."

Id., at 243.

Finally, it

indicated that rather than imposing a lump sum fine against
indigents, a state could adopt a scheme whereby the defendant
would pay the fine over time.

See id., at 244-245 & n. 21.

/

In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 399 (1971), the Court
considered a related situation.

The defendant had been fined

$425 for accumulated traffic offenses, which his indigency
prevented him from paying.

Although these offenses were not

punishable by imprisonment, the defendant was placed in prison
to work off the amount of his fine.

The Court held that "Texas

••. cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause,
limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent
defendant without the means to pay his fine."

Id., at 399.

The particular vice in Short was that the State had found that
its peneological interests did not require any prison term to
be served but imposed a prison terms on indigents because of
their inability to pay.
Short's holding is consistent with Williams.

--

In both
s~

cases, the state had defined the maximum amount of

-------------------------------------~incarceration necessary and had imposed a greater period of

-

-._-

incarceration on indigents.

Although Short's holding is

b~
~

narrow, the opinion adopted the broad reasoning of an earlier
plurality:
"[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in
Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for

~

Uo

failing to make immediate payment of any fine,
whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term
and whether or not the jail term extends beyond the
maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing
and able to pay a fine. In each case, the
Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine
as a sentence and then automatically converting it
into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forewith pay the fine in full."
Id., at 398 (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S.
5 0 8 , 5 0 9 ( 19 7 0) ( pe r cur i am) ) •
Although Short can be limited to the narrow rationale of

,,

I I

Williams, its reasoning suggests that any scheme that
-------------~------------------------

conver~

a lump sum fine into a jail term because of inability to pay is ~
constitutionally
infirm.
---.
__-------.....__-

It indicates that a state first must

seek to use alternative measures, such as installment payments,
and reserves the question of whether it would be constitutional
to imprison an indigent defendant when alternative measures
prove unsuccessful.
A problem with these opinions is that they do not
, make the proper level of scrutiny clear.

~
p

~ I~»

~ ~. ~

Vt

~

~

Griffin purported to ~

ly a rational relationship test and found the statute

~~
infirm ~

ecause the state has no interest in depriving an indigent of a

.
. 1.
f a1r
tr1a

~

.
d'1sgu1ses
.
~~
Th'1s may b e t h e correct resu 1 t, b ut 1t

the application of a ~tiny.

The state

has an obvious fiscal interest in not paying for _ transcripts
for indigents, which the statute rationally advanced.

What

Griffin did was to say that the state's interest was not
sufficient to justify denyiny a class of people, indigents, a
right as fundamental as a

fair ~

It applied, as Professor

-

Gunther has noted, "rational relationship with bite."

9'.

Williams could be viewed as the application of a

~.t-v
~--

~~-A~

~~--:·

rational relationship test on the theory th~ nce the state's ~
interest in incarceration has been satisfied the state has no

~

rational basis for imposing a greater period of incarceration
~--~~--------------------------------on an indigent
defendant. This again slights the state's

'--

interest in Williams.

In that case, the state had determined

that a person convicted of petty theft could be punished by one
year in prison

~

a fine.

If a defendant has served his one

year but cannot pay a fine because of his indigency, then the
state has an interest in exacting that penalty from the
defendant, which the state rationally could have advanced by
subjecting the defendant to a corresponding prison term.
Indeed, to do otherwise would result in inverse discrimination ~
-a rich person who had served his year and paid his fine would
be subjected to a greater penalty than a poor person.

What

Williams appears to have done was again to have applied
"heightened scrutiny" and held implicitly that although the
state's action was rational, it was required to pursue
alternative courses, such as installment payments.

Williams

did not consider the more difficult question of how the state
could achieve its interest in punishment if the defendant's
indigency prevented from meeting his installment payments.

In

this respect, the reasoning in Williams is similar to that in
Short.
Although these cases do not explain their heightened
level of scrutiny, your opinion in San Antonio School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973), perceived a pattern in

.

'

>J.

lU.

their holdings.

It

wealth was a suspect

~-

classification when two conditions were met.

I} __ ./} -""~ ~
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who
~~~11~
constituted the class discriminated against in our
prior cases shar~_ two distinguishing
characteristics (J/because of their impecunity they
were completely unable to pay~or some desired
benefit, and as a consequenc €J:!they sustained an
absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit." Id., at 20.
_Uf

Both the generalization drawn in San Antonio School District
and the previous cases suggest that in this case, the Court
should apply a heightened level of scrutiny.

Although neither

el of scrutiny applied, it

Williams nor Short

level of scrutiny

would seem that an

ould be

consistent with

B.

Whether the State May Require Indigents to Pay Fines

___

On finding that petr was guilty, the state did not

_.... a sentence.
enter judgment or

Instead, it placed petr on

probation, conditioned on his payment of a fine and restitution
over a four month period.

On appeal, it has asserted three

purposes for imprisoning petr for failure to pay the fine and
restitution.

Payment of the fine indicates that the initial

judgment that he might be rehabilitated was correct; the state
has an interest in penalizing indigents who cannot pay their
fines; and the state has an interest in ensuring that victims
of crime receive some compensation.
certainly substantial.

These interests are

Whether the state's means of

implementing these interests are constitutional depends on the
level of scrutiny that is applied.

$.

... :

j_

'

11.

If a normal rational relationship test is applied,

the statute ~---------------------------is valid. It is not irrational for the state to
determine that probationers who do not have the means to

their fines demonstrated that they are not likely to be
rehabilitated.

~

repay~
~~~

Second, imposing a sentence of imprisonment on

those defendants who do not pay their fines is certainly
rationally related to the state's interest in punishing
digent defendants who cannot pay their fines.

Finally, it is

not irrational for the state to suppose that its goal of
restitution would be furthered by placing indigent probationers
in jail.

The threat of jail may prompt concerned family

members or friends to volunteer the restitution money, thus
providing both compensation for the victims and some assurance
that the probationer's relatives and friends will be involved
in aiding his rehabilitation.
Under the heightened level of scrutiny that the Court
previously has applied to such classifications, however, the
statute suffers serious difficulties.

The particular vice of

the statute is not that the interests it asserts are not
substantial.

It is that in implementing them it makes

overbroad generalizations about indigents.

The state asserts

that the failure to pay the fine demonstrates "the likelihood
that [the probationer] would commit another crime."

The state

might determine that some probationers who lack money may be
pressured by their financial status to commit further crimes.
Deciding, however, that the every indigent who is unable to pay
his fine is likely to be unable to rehabilitate himself sweeps

"-----

~

12.
too broadly.
<...

Where, as in this case, the inablity to pay stems

-

from depressed economic conditions, the ind ,i gent • s failure to
pay sheds no light on the probationer's chances for
rehabilitation.
Conversely, imposing a fine may excerbate any
criminal tendencies a probationer has.

An indigent defendant

might be tempted to borrow from "loan sharks," who will charge
him a high rate of interest and place increased pressure on him
to repay the loans by any means, legal or illegal.

In such

circumstances, payment of a fine would not indicate successful
rehabilitation as much as it would show that the probationer
had sought to purchase his freedom at too high a price.

While

financial information about a defendant's chances for
rehabilitation are relevant considerations such information is
best considered on an individualized basis.

Determining that

all indigents pose a poor risk of rehabilitation or that any
person who pays his fine is a good risk is not substantially
related to the State's goal.
The most difficult question involves the second
interest asserted by the state.

Georgia argues that "[i)f

revocation were not permitted petitioner would escape
punishment and, because he was sentenced under Georgia's first
offenders• procedure, even avoid a conviction."
22.

Red Brief at

The state certainly has an interest in punishing convicted

offenders.

If an indigent is unable to pay, he should not

escape the punishment that Georgia lawfully has imposed.

It

~

1}.

might be questioned, however,
------------~

if 1 ~utomatic

rev6catio;' is

-

substantially related to Georgia's interest.
Where the probationer is not withholding payment
willingly and where there is a clear indication that his
indigency is temporary, then it would be consistent with the
state's interests to defer payment.

The petr states, and resp

-_____ ______....__

does not disagree, that he was unable to pay his fine because

~

If the state were to allow petr to .,~
.L~defer his payments until he obtained sufficient money to pay
he was laid off his job.

0/1

the fine, the penalty would be no less.

\j

As Justice Harlan

noted in his concurrence to Williams, "the deterrent effect of
a fine is apt to derive more from its pinch on the purse than
the time of payment."
Nor would there be an additional burden on the state.

-

?

As part of his probation, state has undertaken to monitor the
course of petr's rehabilitation.

Because the state already has

committed its resources to keeping track of petr, it will incur ~

~f-?

no additional burden in determining whether petr will be in a
position to pay the fines.

If the state determines that petr

could pay or never can pay, then it may assert its interest in
exacting some sort of punishment by incarcerating him.

The

primary effect of applying heightened scrutiny would be to sa
---------iZ
,l
that Georgia may not revoke his probation automatically_on
nonpayment.

~

Georgia can deprive an indigent defendant of his

liberty to exact punishment only after it has determined that
alternate means will not suffice.

This reasoning is implici

in the analysis used in both Williams and Short.

,.

14.

Even if Georgia determines that there is no
reasonable possibility that petr will repay his fine, then
there is a further problem with the statute.

---

not seek to set equivalent penalties.

~

~

The statute does

In this respect, it is

....._-~~

unlike a statute in which the legislatur ~ t~cing
judge has made a determination that incarceration for a week
~...---"""'

the equivalent of a $100 fine.

Instead, the fine is one of

several conditions designed to provide a modicum of punishment
and proof of rehabilitation.

Imposing the entire sentence on

the defendant as an alternative for the punishment embodied in
the fine is not substantially related to the degree to which
Georgia seeks to punish petr.
Finally, revoking probation because the defendant is
indigent does not advance the state's interest in remedying the ;r~
harm done to the victim's of the crime.

Although it may

provide the victims with a moral satisfaction at seeing that
the cause of their loss has been punished, it does not further
the state's announced end of compensating them monetarily.
Indeed, it cuts off both the defendant's obligation and ability
to repay.

Where, as here, there is a possiblity that petr will

regain a job, the state's ends would be served better by
allowing him to defer his obligation to restore the money to
the victims.

Conclusion

·'<

1.

Williams and Short both indicate that a · heightened level of

scrutiny should be applied to statutes that place indigents in
jail for failing to pay their fines.

2.

~~

~ ~ ~ ~

Although the state's interest in rehabilitating

~

probationers is substantial, the payment or non-payment j f a
fine is not substantially related to the interest.

When an

~~~

indigent defendant's nonpayment results from depressed economic

conditions, as was the case here, then his failure to pay

~

does ~
~
~

not reflect any lapse that would suggest he is less likely to

~

be rehabilitated.

/t-V()~

substantia~~

The state's
interest in exacting punishment is
- -- ----...
When, however, there are reasonable, alternate means of
3.

·~·

accomplishing that end without imprisoning the defendant then
the state must pursue them.

~
~

If the state decides that

imprisonment is necessary in this case, then the statute is

- ----

------

still flawed.

The period of incarceration imposed by statute

is not related to the state's punitive interest in imposing the
-----~-------------------------------------------fine.

-

4.

Finally, it undercuts, rather than furthers the state's

interest in compensating the victims to place all indigent
probationers in jail without determining whether there is a
reasonable possibility that they will be able to pay
restitution in the future.

'\

·'
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Memorandum to the Conference.
~ .
~ W
The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth
~'
mendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent deprobation for failure fully to pay a fine and restituI /) '-:--tion. Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the
115> ~
acceptability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant
1_ ~actors when determining an appropriate sentence for an in~ ~dividual and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant
~ solely because of his lack of financial resources. We cont:;
elude, on the record presented here, that the trial court erred
·1
in automatically revoking probation because petitioner could
lfi7) _
,
not pay his fine. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
~ ~ Georgia Court of Appeals upholding the revocation of proba- I t9 tion, and remand for a new sentencing determination.

1;

-..----:-::; ~1

(I~~

_ _

L-,./~..,- ~dant's

9_,z_

~~"~ ~

-/)

I

In September 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies
of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He
~A~~
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pur{/f')V~ _ _ ~., . suant to the Georgia First Offender's Act, Ga. Code. Ann.
~~ §§27-2727 et. seq. (current version at §§42-8-60 et. seq.
.., (~~ Supp.)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of
~ .. ( ~iit, but deferred further proceedings and sentenced petitioner to three years on probation for the burglary charge
~
~
and
a concurrent one year on probation for the theft charge.
{
~

~- ~'-5 ~Vl./~~.-IZ/1~

·
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As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered petitioner
to pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 1 Petitioner was to
pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance
within four months.
Petitioner borrowed money from his parents and paid the
first $200. About a month later, however, petitioner was
laid off from his job. Petitioner, who has only a n~e
education and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other
work but was unable to do so. The record indicates that petitioner had no income or assets during this period.
Shortly before the balance of the fine and restitution came
due in February 1981, petitioner notified the probation office
he was going to be late with his payment because he could not
find a job. In May 1981, the State filed a petition in the trial
court to revoke petitioner's probation because he had not
paid the balance. 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court revoked probation for failure to pay the balance of the
fine and restitution, 3 entered a conviction and sentenced pe1
The trial court ordered a payment of $200 restitution for the theft by
receiving charge; and ordered payment of $50 in restitution and $500 fine
for the burglary charge.
The other conditions of probation prohibited petitioner from leaving the
jurisdiction of the court without permission, from drinking alcoholic beverages, using or possessing narcotics, or visiting places where alcoholic beverages or narcotics are sold, from keeping company with persons of bad
reputation, from violating any penal law, and required him to avoid places
of disreputable character, to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar
as possible, and to report to the probation officer as directed and to permit
the probation officer to visit him.
2
The State's petition alleged two grounds for revoking probation: petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution, and an alleged burglary he
committed on May 10, 1981. The State abandoned the latter ground at the
hearing to revoke probation, and counsel has informed us that petitioner
was later acquitted of the charge. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1.
3
The trial court also found that petitioner violated the conditions of probation by failing to report to his probation officer as directed. Since the
trial court was unauthorized under state law to revoke probation on a
ground not stated in the petition, Radcliff v. State, 134 Ga. App. 244, 214
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titioner to serve the remaining portion of the probationary
period in prison. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals, relying on
earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases, 5 rejected petitioner's
claim that imprisoning him for inability to pay the fine violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. Since
other courts have held that revoking the probation of indigents for failure to pay fines does violate the Equal Protection Clause, 6 we granted certiorari to resolve this important
issue in the administration of criminal justice. 458 U. S.
(1981).
II
This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter-century ago, Justice Black declared that "there can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12,
19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin's principle of "equal
justice," which the Court applied there to strike down a state
practice of granting appellate review only to persons able to
afford a trial transcript, has been applied in numerous other
S.E. 2d 179 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the revocation solely on the
basis of petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution.
'The trial court first sentenced petitioner to five years in prison, with a
concurrent three-year sentence for the theft conviction. Since the record
of the initial sentencing hearing failed to reveal that petitioner had been
warned that a violation of probation could result in a longer prison term
than the original probationary period, as required by Stevens v. State, 245
Ga. 835, 268 S.E. 2d 330 (1980), the court reduced the prison term to the
remainder of the probationary period.
5
Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v.
Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E. 2d 455 (1974).
'See, e. g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo,
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P. 2d 999 (1970); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P. 2d
191 (1971); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A. 2d 137 (1971); State ex
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N. W. 2d 778 (1972).
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contexts. See, e. g.,vJJouglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963) (indigent entitled to counsel on first direct appeal);
vRoberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to
free transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); 'Mayer
v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (indigent cannot be denied
an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only
statute). Most relevant to the issues here is the holding in
Vwilliams v. I llinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), that a State cannot
subjeclaCertarn class of convicted defendants to a period of
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because
they are too poor to pay the fine. Williams was followed
and extended in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), which
held that a State cannot convert a fine imposed under a fineonly statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in full. :full the
Court has also reco ·zed limits on the rinci le of rotectmg
indigents m t e criminal JUstice system. For example, in
Ross_:T]!l_§.ffitj,, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), we held that indigents
hadnoconstitutional right to appointed counsel for a discretionary appeal. In United States v. MacCallum, 426
U. S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion), we rejected an equal protection challenge to a federal statute which permits a district
court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if
the court certifies that the challenge to his conviction is not
frivolous and the transcript is necessary to prepare his
petition.
Due process and equal protection principles converge in
the Court's analysis in these cases. See Griffin v. Illinois,
supra, at 17. Most decisions in this area have rested on an
equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in particular has insisted that a due process approach more accurately captures the competing concerns. See, e. g., Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 29-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 259-266 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). As we recognized in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S.,
at 608-609, we generally analyze the fairness of relations be-
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tween the criminal defendant and the State under the Due
Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under
the Equal Protection Clause.
The question presented here is whether a sentencing court ) ~f- &:can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that
~
l
the defendant was somehow res onsible for the failure. The .r~
parties, ol owmg t e !§:_mework of i hams and a.te, have H.£_
argued the question primarily in te~s of equal protection,
and vigorously debate whether strict scrutiny or rational
basis is the appropriate standard of review. There is no
doubt that the State has treated the petitioner differently
from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and
~ j,/1
therefore did not violate probation. To determine whether
this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection
C-f f/ ~~
Clause, one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered
in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process question
of whether it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the
~~
State to revoke probation for failure to pay the fine without
inquiry into the reason for the probationer's failure to pay or
whether alternative punishment is feasible. 7 Whether ana-

4'

q

17//)

We have previously applied considerations of procedural and substantive fairness to probation and parole revocation proceedings.
In
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we established certain
procedural requirements for parole revocation hearings, we recognized
that society has an "interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness."
I d., at 484. We addressed the issue of fundamental fairness more directly
in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1972), where we held that in certain
cases "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or
parolees." !d., at 790. Fundamental fairness, we determined, presumptively requires counsel when the probationer claims that "there are sub7
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lyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, 8 the issue
cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such fac~s "the nature of the individual mterestarleCte(f,tne extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection
between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence
of alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... "
Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In analyzing this issue, of course, we do not write on a
clean slate, for both Williams and Tate anal zed similar siture vitartO a
ations. The reach and 1mits o their o ·
p;:oper resolution of the issue here. In illiams a defendant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine authorized under the statute. Because of his indigency he
could not pay the fine. Pursuant to another statute equating
a $5 fine with a day in jail, the defendant was kept in jail for
101 days beyond the maximum prison sentence to "work out"
the fine. The Court struck down the practice, holding that
stantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate." Ibid. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430 (1973), we
found a substantive violation of due process when a state court had revoked
probation with no evidence that the probationer had violated probation.
Today we address whether a court can revoke probation for failure to pay a
fine and restitution when there is no evidence that the petitioner was at
fault in his failure to pay or that alternate means of punishment were
inadequate.
8
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's financial
background can play in determining an appropriate sentence. When the
court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's level of
financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification.
Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting "the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is
a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished," North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate question is
whether consideration of a defendant's financial background in setting or
resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due
process.
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"[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum
solely by reason of their indigency." 399 U. S., at 233--234.
In Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), we faced a similar situation, except that the statutory penalty there permitted only
a fine. Quoting from a concurring opinion in Morris v.
Schoonfield, 399 U. S. 508, 509 (1970), we reasoned that "the
same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a
person willing and able to pay a fine." 401 U. S., at 398.
The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State can~~
not "impos[e a fin;as a sentence and then automatic~conw~ vl~
vert lt into a jm term solely ecause the aefendant is indigent and cannot forth~_!_h~~ll!'~ supra,
at~ros,utheStafe~determines a fine to be '/L_; fi~ ~,/0~
the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may lr---~~
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the ~~
resources to pay it. Both Williams and Tate carefully distinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of (~r
indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in
~
failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in Williams,
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for
~ p_,~u.,c .1,
willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs." 399 U. S., at
-~-.~~
242, n. 19. Likewise in Tate, the Court "emphasize[d] that
ou holding today does not suggest any constitutional infir~~-~~
. . in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a
crJ,~~)
fine who refuses or neglects to do so." 401 U. S., at 400.
This distinction, based on the reasons for non-payment, is
jyvO
of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully
() ~
y refused to pay the fine when he has the means to pay, the
I? ~~ State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanc-

~~Jvt~

~
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~'

tion to enforce collection. See
Model Penal _Qode
§ 302.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). S imilarly, a probationer's failure to make sufficient efforts to seek employment
or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may
reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment
as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the ,prubatio~r has made all r~onable ef:0-rts to pay the fi~ , and yet
cannot do sotfirougn no fault oj hi§_2wn, it is fundamentcilly
unTair to revoke probatiOrlautomatically without attempting
to employ alterna 1ve methods o punishing the defendant.
This lack of fault provides a "substantial reaso[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and make revocation inappropriate." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 790. 9 Cf. Za9
Numerous decisions by state and federal courts have recognized that
basiclairnessrorl5ids the revocation of probation when the probationer is
without fault in his failure to pay the fine. For example, in United States
v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1979), the court distinguished between revoking probation where the defendant did not have the resources to pay
restitution and had no way to acquire them-a revocation the court found
improper-from revoking probation where the defendant had the resources to pay or had ne ligently or deliberately allowed them to be dissipated in a manner t at resulte m IS ma ihty to pay-an entirely legitimate action by the trial court. Accord, United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d
339 (CA41965); United States v. Wilson, 469 F. 2d 368 (CA2 1972); State v.
Huggett, 525 P. 2d 1119 (Haw. 1974); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 11&-117,
473 P. 2d 999, 1007-1009 (1970); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266
N. W. 2d 403, 408 (1978). Commentators have similarly distinguished be- ;
tween the permissibility of revoking probation for contumacious failure to
pay a fine, and the impermissibility of revoking probation when the probationer made good-faith efforts to pay. See, e. g., ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice 18-7.4 and Commentary (2d ed. I980) ("mcarce ration
should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for nonpayment"); ALI, Model Penal Code § 302.2 (distinguishing "contumacious"
failure to pay fine from "good faith effort" to obtain funds); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections
§ 5.5 (1973); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

·"'<t,1

/l L/
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blocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 400 (1978) (POWELL, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing, under both due process and
equal protection analyses, persons who shirk their moral and
legal obligation to pay child support from those wholly unable
to pay).
A probationer who has made adequate bona fide efforts to
pay his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the
ot~ <:2_n~it!2E~ti9n, has demonstra e a willingness
to pay lliS<fehf to soCiety-' and an ability to conform his conduct to social norms. The cause of his violation-his indigency-does not by itself endanger the safety or welfare of
society. The State nevertheless asserts that its penological
interests require that probation be revoked in such a situation. Of course, the State has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate
its criminal laws. A defe
' o ert in no wa im uniz~him fro1}1 _pujli~t.
Thus, when determining initial~State's penological interests require imposition of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can
consider the entire background of the defendant, including
his employment history and financial resources. See Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 247, 250, and n. 15 (1949). As
we said in Williams v. Illinois, "[a]fter having taken into
consideration the wide range of factors underlying the exercise of his sentencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law." 399
U. S., at 243.
The decision to place the defendant on probation, however,
reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the
State's penological interests do not require imprisonment.
See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 264 (Harlan, J., conLaws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act §§ 3-404 (1978). See also
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 1304; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38,
~ 1005-6-4(d).

·'
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curring); Woods v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 286-287 (WHITE,
J., dissenting). As indicated above, a probationer's failure
to make reasonable efforts to repay his debt to society may
indicate that this original determination needs reevaluation,
and imprisonment may now be required to satisfy the State's
interests. But if the probationer has made adequate bona
fide efforts yet cannot pay, the interests asserted by the
State do not justify imprisonment for that reason alone.
The State argues that revoking probation furthers its interest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the victims of
crime. A rule that imprisonment may befall the probationer
who fails to make adequate bona fide efforts to pay restitution may indeed spur probationers to try hard to pay,
thereby increasing the number of probationers who make
restitution. Such a goal is fully served, however, by revoking probation only for persons who have not made sufficiently
adequate bona fide efforts. Revoking the probation of someone who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. It is
arbitrary, therefore, to imprison such a probationer in an attempt to ensure restitution under such circumstances.
More plausibly, the State argues that its interests in punishing the lawbreaker and deterring others from criminal behavior require it to revoke probation for failure to pay a fine
or restitution. The State clearly has an interest in punish- ~
ment and deterrence, but this interest can often be served
fulll EX. ~lt~~ati~e means. As we saiain WiZlU.iinB; 399
U. s:-;ar~iterated in Tate, 401 U.S., at 399, "[t]he
State is not powerless to enforce judgments against those financially unable to pay a fine." For example, the sentencing
court could extend the time for making payments, or reduce
the fine, or direct that the probationer perform some form of
labor or public service in lieu of the fine. Justice Harlan appropriately observed in his concurring opinion in Williams
that "the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to derive more from
its pinch on the purse than the time of payment." Williams,
supra, , at 265. Indeed, given the general flexibility of tai-

.,,

,.
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loring fines to the resources of a defendant, or even permitting the defendant to do specified work to satisfy the fine, see
Williams, 399 U. S., at 244, n. 21, it seems unlikely that a
sentencing court could not establish a reduced fine or alternate public service in lieu of a fine that adequately serves the
state's goals of punishment and deterrence, given the defendant's diminished financial resources. Only if the alt~tives
to imprisonment are not feasible in a particular situation does
thEEJtate's ~i§.~d aliter reguire it to imru:.ison a
probationer who has made ade uate bona fide efforts to pay.
This eaves on y e tate's assertion a 1 s 1 e e in rehabilitating the probationer and protecting society requires it
to remove him from the temptation of committing other
crimes-a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty by itself indicates he may commit crimes in the future and thus
that society needs for him to be incapacitated. We have already indicated that a sentencing court can consider a defendant's employment history and financial resources in setting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a
necessary part of evaluating the entire background of the defendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the defendant and crime. But it must remembered that the State
is seeking here to use as the sole justification for imprisonment the poverty of a probationer who, by assumption, has
demonstrated adequate bona fide efforts to find a job and pay
the fine and whom the State initially thought it unnecessary
to imprison. Given the significant interest of the individual
in remaining on probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U. S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972),
it is fundamentally unfair for the State to incarcerate a probationer who has demonstrated adequate bona fide efforts to
repay his debt to society, solely by lumping him together
with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as dangerous. 10 This would be little more than punishing a person
for his poverty.
10

The State emphasizes several empirical studies suggesting a correla-

81-6633-MEMORANDUM
12

BEARDEN v. GEORGIA

We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of fault in violating a term of probation prevents a
court from revoking probation. For instance, a common condition of probation for a person convicted of a drug or alcohol
offense is that he receive rehabilitative treatment. Certainly, the sentencing court is justified in determining that
society's need for protection requires that a criminal defendant with an uncured drug or alcohol addiction be incarcerated. See, e. g., United States v. Manfredonia, 341 F.
Supp. 790, 794, and n. 6 (SDNY), aff'd, 459 F. 2d 1392 (CA2
1972). Humphrey v. State, 428 A. 2d 440, 444 (Md. Ct. App.
1981) (Rodowsky, J., diss.); Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. 8.
514 (1968). Indeed, it may be reckless for a court to permit a
person convicted of driving while intoxicated, for example, to
remain on probation once it becomes evident that efforts at
controlling his public drunkenness have failed. Ultimately,
it must be remembered that the sentence was not imposed
for a circumstance beyond the probationer's control "but because he had committed a crime." Williams, supra, at 242.
In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driving, however, the condition at issue here-indigency-is itself no
threat to the safety or welfare of society.
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure topay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make adequate
bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing
authority. If the probationer could not pay despite adequate
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than
imprisonment. Only if alternate measure~ are not feasible
~-----------

~

1

>

tion between poverty and crime. E . g., Green, Race, Social Status, and
Criminal Arrest, 35 Amer. Soc. Rev. 476 (1978); M. Wolfgang, R. Figlio,
& T. Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (1972).
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may the court imprison a probationer who has made adequate
bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the
probationer of his conditional freedom simply because,
through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a
deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

III
We return to the facts of this case. At the parole revocation hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified about their
lack of income and assets and of his repeated efforts to obtain
work. While the sentencing court commented on the availability of odd jobs such as lawn-mowing, it made no finding
that the petitioner had not made adequate bona fide efforts to
find work, and the record as it presently stands would not
justify such a finding. This lack of findings is understandable, of course, for under the rulings of the Georgia Supreme
Court 11 such an inquiry would have been irrelevant to the
constitutionality of revoking probation. The State argues
that the sentencing court determined that the petitioner was
no longer a good probation risk. In the absence of a determination that the petitioner did not make adequate bona fide
efforts to pay or to obtain employment in order to pay, we
cannot read the opinion of the sentencing court as reflecting
such a finding. Instead, the court curtly rejected counsel's
suggestion that the time for making the payments be extended, saying that "the fallacy in that argument" is that the
petitioner has long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did
not comply with the court's prior order to pay. App. 45.
The court declared that "I don't know any way to enforce the
prior orders of the Court but one way," which was to sentence him to imprisonment. Ibid.
The focus of the court's concern, then, was that the petitioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, and
for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more
11

• 1

See cases cited at n. 5, supra .
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than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to
pay the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate.
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he
could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for
the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or
extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison
sentence.
We do not suggest by our analysis of the present record /
that the State may not place the petitioner in prison. If,
upon remand, the Georgia courts determine that petitioner
did not make adequate bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or de\
termine that alternate punishment is not feasible, imprisonment would be a permissible sentence. Unless such determinations are made, however, fundamental fairness requires
that the petitioner remain on probation.

t

IV
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

fur~

It is so ordered.
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Thus, whenever a

defendant is making good faith attempts to pay, the State must
consider alternative measures such as extending the time for pa
or allowing the defendant to "work off the fine" by performing
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BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION,
INC., PETITIONER
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PEDRO CASTRO ET AL.
NANCY B. BEECHER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
82-259
v.
BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF .J.
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
1'-f[May - , 1983]

PER CURIAM.

In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit upheld the District Court's August 7, 1981 orders enjoining the Boston Police and Fire Departments from
laying off policemen and firefighters in a manner that would
reduce the percentage of minority officers below the level obtaining at the commencement of layoffs in July, 1981. 679 F.
2d 965 (1982). These orders had the effect of partially superseding the operation of the state's statutory last-hired, firstfired scheme for civil service layoffs, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.

82-185, 82-246
2

&

82-259-PER CURIAM

FIREFIGHTERS v. BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP

ch. 31, § 39. Following the Court of Appeals' decision,
Massachusetts enacted legislation providing the City of Boston with new revenues, requiring reinstatement of all police
and firefighters laid off during the reductions in force, securing these personnel against future layoffs for fiscal reasons,
and requiring the maintenance of minimum staffing levels in
the police and fire departments through June 30, 1983. See
1982 Mass. Acts, c. 190, § 25. In light of these changed circumstances, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand for consideration of mootness in light of 1982
Mass. Acts, c. 190, § 25.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of these cases.
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Dear Sandra,
Should your Memorandum become an opinion,
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JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
We deal here with the recurring situation where a persbn is
convicted under a statute that authorizes fines or imprisonm~nt
or both, as well as probation.
The defendant is then fined ahd
placed on probation, one of the conditions of which is that he
pay the fine and make restitution.
In such a situation, the
Court takes
as a given that the state has decided that
imprisonment is inappropriate because it is unnecessary to
achieve its penal objectives.
But that is true only if the
defendant pays the fine and makes restitution and thereby suffers
the financial penalty that such payment entails.
Had: the
sentencing judge been quite sure that the defendant could not pay
the fine, I cannot believe that the court would not have imposed
some jail time or that either the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution would prevent such imposition.
Poverty does not insulate those who break the law from
punishment. When probation is revoked for failure to pay a fine,
I find nothing in the Constitution to prevent the trial court
from revoking probation and imposing a term of imprisonment if
revocation does not @ u omatically result in the imposition of a
long jail term and i but the sentencing court makes a good-faith
effort to impose a Jal
sentence · that in terms of the state's
sentencing objectives will be roughly equivalent to the fine and
restitution that the defendant ( failed to pay.
See Wood v.
Georgia, 450 u.s. 261, 284-287 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
Even if
as a constitutional matter, the ~ entencing court should consider
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alternatives short of imprisonment, I would not think the court
would be required actually to try them if it believes that they
would not be equivalent in terms of the state's penal objectives
to the fine
and restitution that had been conditions of
probation.
In this case, however, the state court did not appear to
find that the prison term improved was "a rational and necessary
trade-off to punish the individual who possessed no accumulated
assets", Wilkins v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 265 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
Sincerely, '.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-6633

DANNY R. BEARDEN, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
GEORGIA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution.
Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the acceptability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant factors
when determining an appropriate sentence for an individual
and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant solely because of his lack of financial resources. We conclude that the
trial court erred in automatically revoking probation because
petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that
petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or
that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Court of
Appeals upholding the revocation of probation, and remand
for a new sentencing determination.
I
In September 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies
of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pursuant to the Georgia First Offender's Act, Ga. Code. Ann.
§§ 27-2727 et seq. (current version at §§ 42-8-60 et seq. (1982
Supp.)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of guilt, but
deferred further proceedings and sentenced petitioner to

J
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three years on probation for the burglary charge and a concurrent one year on probation for the theft charge. As a
condition of probation, the trial court ordered petitioner to
pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 1 Petitioner was to
pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance
within four months.
Petitioner borrowed money from his parents and paid the
first $200. About a month later, however, petitioner was
laid off from his job. Petitioner, who has only a ninth grade
education and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other
work but was unable to do so. The record indicates that petitioner had no income or assets during this period.
Shortly before the balance of the fine and restitution came
due in February 1981, petitioner notified the probation office
he was going to be late with his payment because he could not
find a job. In May 1981, the State filed a petition in the trial
court to revoke petitioner's probation because he had not
paid the balance. 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court revoked probation for failure to pay the balance of the
fine and restitution, 3 entered a conviction and sentenced pe1
The trial court ordered a payment of $200 restitution for the theft by
receiving charge; and ordered payment of $50 in restitution and $500 fine
for the burglary charge.
The other conditions of probation prohibited petitioner from leaving the
jurisdiction of the court without permission, from drinking alcoholic beverages, using or possessing narcotics, or visiting places where alcoholic beverages or narcotics are sold, from keeping company with persons of bad
reputation, from violating any penal law; and required him to avoid places
of disreputable character, to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar
as possible, and to report to the probation officer as directed and to permit
the probation officer to visit him.
2
The State's petition alleged two grounds for revoking probation: petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution, and an alleged burglary he
committed on May 10, 1981. The State abandoned the latter ground at the
hearing to revoke probation, and counsel has informed us that petitioner
was later acquitted of the charge. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1.
3
The trial court also found that petitioner violated the conditions of pro-
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titioner to serve the remaining portion of the probationary
period in prison. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals, relying on
earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases, 5 rejected petitioner's
claim that imprisoning him for inability to pay the fine violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. Since
other courts have held that revoking the probation of indigents for failure to pay fines does violate the Equal Protection Clause, 6 we granted certiorari to resolve this important
issue in the administration of criminal justice. 458 U. S.
(1981).
II
This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter-century ago, Justice Black declared that "there can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12,
19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin's principle of "equal
justice," which the Court applied there to strike down a state
bation by failing to report to his probation officer as directed. Since the
trial court was unauthorized under state law to revoke probation on a
ground not stated in the petition, Radcliff v. State, 134 Ga. App. 244, 214
S.E. 2d 179 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the revocation solely on the
basis of petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution.
'The trial court first sentenced petitioner to five years in prison, with a
concurrent three-year sentence for the theft conviction. Since the record
of the initial sentencing hearing failed to reveal that petitioner had been
warned that a violation of probation could result in a longer prison tenn
than the original probationary period, as required by Stevens v. State, 245
Ga. 835, 268 S.E. 2d 330 (1980), the court reduced the prison tenn to the
remainder of the probationary period.
5
Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v.
Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E. 2d 455 (1974).
•see, e. g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo,
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P. 2d 999 (1970); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P. 2d
191 (1971); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A. 2d 137 (1971); State ex
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N. W. 2d 778 (1972).
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practice of granting appellate review only to persons able to
afford a trial transcript, has been applied in numerous other
contexts. See, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963) (indigent entitled to counsel on first direct appeal);
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to
free transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); Mayer
v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (indigent cannot be denied
an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only
statute). Most relevant to the issue here is the holding in
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), that a State cannot
subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because
they are too poor to pay the fine. Williams was followed
and extended in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), which
held that a State cannot convert a fine imposed under a fineonly statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in full. But the
Court has also recognized limits on the principle of protecting
indigents in the criminal justice system. For example, in
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), we held that indigents
had no constitutional right to appointed counsel for a discretionary appeal. In United States v. MacCallum, 426
U. S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion), we rejected an equal protection challenge to a federal statute which permits a district
court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if
the court certifies that the challenge to his conviction is not
frivolous and the transcript is necessary to prepare his
petition.
Due process and equal protection principles converge in
the Court's analysis in these cases. See Griffin v. Illinois,
supra, at 17. Most decisions in this area have rested on an
equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in particular has insisted that a due process approach more accurately captures the competing concerns. See, e. g., Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 29-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wil-
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liams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 259-266 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). As we recognized in Ross v. M ofjitt, 417 U. S.,
at 608-609, we generally analyze the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due
Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under
the Equal Protection Clause.
The question presented here is whether a sentencing court
can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that
the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or
that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate. The
parties, following the framework of Williams and Tate, have
argued the question primarily in terms of equal protection,
and debate vigorously whether strict scrutiny or rational
basis is the appropriate standard of review. There is no
doubt that the State has treated the petitioner differently
from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and
therefore did not violate probation. To determine whether
this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection
Clause, one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered
in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process question
of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary
for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable
to pay the fine. 7 Whether analyzed in terms of equal protec7
We have previously applied considerations of procedural and substantive fairness to probation and parole revocation proceedings. In M orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we established certain procedural requirements for parole revocation hearings, we recognized that
society has an "interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness." I d., at
484. We addressed the issue of fundamental fairness more directly in
Gagnon v. Scar pelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1972), where we held that in certain
cases "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require
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tion or due process, 8 the issue cannot be resolved by resort to
easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a
careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... " Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 260
(Harlan, J., concurring).
In analyzing this issue, of course, we do not write on a
clean slate, for both Williams and Tate analyzed similar situations. The reach and limits of their holdings are vital to a
proper resolution of the issue here. In Williams, a defendant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine authorized under the statute. Because of his indigency he
could not pay the fine. Pursuant to another statute equating
a $5 fine with a day in jail, the defendant was kept in jail for
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or
parolees." Id., at 790. Fundamental fairness, we determined, presumptively requires counsel when the probationer claims that "there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate." Ibid. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430 (1973), we
found a substantive violation of due process when a state court had revoked
probation with no evidence that the probationer had violated probation.
Today we address whether a court can revoke probation for failure to pay a
fine and restitution when there is no evidence that the petitioner was at
fault in his failure to pay or that alternate means of punishment were
inadequate.
8
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's financial
background can play in determining an appropriate sentence. When the
court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's level of
financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification.
Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting "the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is
a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished," North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate question is
whether consideration of a defendant's financial background in setting or
resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due
process.
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101 days beyond the maximum prison sentence to "work out"
the fine. The Court struck down the practice, holding that
"[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum
solely by reason of their indigency." 399 U. S., at 233-234.
In Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), we faced a similar situation, except that the statutory penalty there permitted only
a fine. Quoting from a concurring opinion in Morris v.
Schoonfield, 399 U. S. 508, 509 (1970), we reasoned that "the
same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a
person willing and able to pay a fine." 401 U. S., at 398.
The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State cannot "impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." Tate, supra,
at 398. In other words, if the State determines a fine to be
the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the
resources to pay it. Both Williams and Tate carefully distinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of
indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in
failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in Williams,
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for
willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs." 399 U. S., at
242, n. 19. Likewise in Tate, the Court "emphasize[d] that
our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a
fine who refuses or neglects to do so." 401 U. S., at 400.
This distinction, based on the reasons for non-payment, is
of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully
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refused to pay the fine when he has the means to pay, the
State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. See ALI, Model Penal Code
§ 302.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Similarly, a probationer's failure to make sufficient efforts to seek employment
or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may
reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment
as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine, and yet
cannot do so through no fault of his own, 9 it is fundamentally
unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering J
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available. This lack of fault provides a "substantial reaso[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and
make revocation inappropriate." Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
supra, at 790. 10 Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 400
9
We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of
fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent a court
from revoking probation. For instance, it may indeed be reckless for a
court to permit a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on
probation once it becomes evident that efforts at controlling his chronic
drunken driving have failed. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968);
Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). Ultimately, it must be remembered that the sentence was not imposed for a circumstance beyond
the probationer's control "but because he had committed a crime." Williams, supra, at 242. In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driving, however, the condition at issue here--indigency-is itself no threat to
the safety or welfare of society.
10
Numerous decisions by state and federal courts have recognized that
basic fairness forbids the revocation of probation when the probationer is
without fault in his failure to pay the fine. For example, in United States
v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1979), the court distinguished between revoking probation where the defendant did not have the resources to pay
restitution and had no way to acquire them-a revocation the court found
improper-from revoking probation where the defendant had the resources to pay or had negligently or deliberately allowed them to be dissipated in a manner that resulted in his inability to pay-an entirely legiti-
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(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) (distinguishing, under both
due process and equal protection analyses, persons who shirk
their moral and legal obligation to pay child support from
those wholly unable to pay).
The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its
criminal laws. A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes
him from punishment. Thus, when determining initially
whether the State's penological interests require imposition
of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can consider
the entire background of the defendant, including his employment history and financial resources. See Williams v. New
York, 337 U. S. 247, 250, and n. 15 (1949). As we said in
Williams v. Illinois, "[a]fter having taken into consideration
the wide range of factors underlying the exercise of his sentencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from
imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum
penalty prescribed by law." 399 U. S., at 243.
The decision to place the defendant on probation, however,
reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the
State's penological interests do not require imprisonment.
mate action by the trial court. Accord, United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d
339 (CA4 1965); United States v. Wilson, 469 F. 2d 368 (CA2 1972); State v.
Huggett, 525 P. 2d 1119 (Haw. 1974); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 115-117,
473 P. 2d 999, 1007-1009 (1970); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266
N. W. 2d 403, 408 (1978). Commentators have similarly distinguished between the permissibility of revoking probation for contumacious failure to
pay a fine, and the impermissibility of revoking probation when the probationer made good-faith efforts to pay. See, e. g., ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice 18-7.4 and Commentary (2d ed. 1980) ("incarceration
should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for nonpayment"); ALI, Model Penal Code § 302.2 (distinguishing "contumacious"
failure to pay fine from "good faith effort" to obtain funds); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections
§ 5.5 (1973); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act§§ 3-403, 3-404 (1978). See
also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 1304; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38,
~ 1005-6--4(d).
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See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 264 (Harlan, J., concurring); Woods v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 286-287 (WHITE,
J., dissenting). A probationer's failure to make reasonable
efforts to repay his debt to society may indicate that this
original determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment
may now be required to satisfy the State's interests. But a
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay
his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the other
conditions of probation, has demonstrated a willingness to
pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his conduct
to social norms. The State nevertheless asserts three reasons why imprisonment is required to further its penal goals.
First, the State argues that revoking probation furthers its
interest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the victims of
crime. A rule that imprisonment may befall the probationer
who fails to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay restitution may indeed spur probationers to try hard to pay,
thereby increasing the number of probationers who make
restitution. Such a goal is fully served, however, by revoking probation only for persons who have not made sufficient
bona fide efforts to pay. Revoking the probation of someone
who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitution
will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. Indeed,
such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the
probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds to pay in
order to avoid revocation.
Second, the State asserts that its interest in rehabilitating
the probationer and protecting society requires it to remove
him from the temptation of committing other crimes. This is
no more than a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty
by itself indicates he may commit crimes in the future and
thus that society needs for him to be incapacitated. We have
already indicated that a sentencing court can consider a
defendant's employment history and financial resources in
setting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a necessary part of evaluating the entire background of the de-
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fendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the defendant and crime. But it must remembered that the State
is seeking here to use as the sole justification for imprisonment the poverty of a probationer who, by assumption, has
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to find a job and pay
the fine and whom the State initially thought it unnecessary
to imprison. Given the significant interest of the individual
in remaining on probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U. S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972),
the State cannot justify incarcerating a probationer who has
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt to
society, solely by lumping him together with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as dangerous. 11 This would
be little more than punishing a person for his poverty.
Third, and most plausibly, the State argues that its interests in punishing the lawbreaker and deterring others from
criminal behavior require it to revoke probation for failure to
pay a fine or restitution. The State clearly has an interest in
punishment and deterrence, but this interest can often be
served fully by alternative means. As we said in Williams,
399 U. S., at 244, and reiterated in Tate, 401 U. S., at 399,
"[t]he State is not powerless to enforce judgments against
those financially unable to pay a fine." For example, the
sentencing court could extend the time for making payments,
or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform
some form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine. Justice Harlan appropriately observed in his concurring opinion
in Williams that "the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to derive more from its pinch on the purse than the time of payment." Ibid., at 265. Indeed, given the general flexibility
of tailoring fines to the resources of a defendant, or even perThe State emphasizes several empirical studies suggesting a correlation between poverty and crime. E. g., Green, Race, Social Status, and
Criminal Arrest, 35 Amer. Soc. Rev. 476 (1978); M. Wolfgang, R. Figlio,
& T. Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (1972).
11
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mitting the defendant to do specified work to satisfy the fine,
see Williams, supra, at 244, n. 21, it....s.eQm~ a sentencing
court can often establish a reduced fine or alternate public
service in lieu of a fine that adequately serves the State's
goals of punishment and deterrence, given the defendant's diminished financial resources. Only if the sentencing court
determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest in
punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient
bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing
authority. If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate
to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence
may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.
Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

III
We return to the facts of this case. At the parole revocation hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified about their
lack of income and assets and of his repeated efforts to obtain
work. While the sentencing court commented on the availability of odd jobs such as lawn-mowing, it made no finding

~
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that the petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to
find work, and the record as it presently stands would not
justify such a finding. This lack of findings is understandable, of course, for under the rulings of the Georgia Supreme
Court 12 such an inquiry would have been irrelevant to the
constitutionality of revoking probation. The State argues
that the sentencing court determined that the petitioner was
no longer a good probation risk. In the absence of a determination that the petitioner did not make sufficient bona fide
efforts to pay or to obtain employment in order to pay, we
cannot read the opinion of the sentencing court as reflecting
such a finding. Instead, the court curtly rejected counsel's
suggestion that the time for making the payments be extended, saying that "the fallacy in that argument" is that the
petitioner has long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did
not comply with the court's prior order to pay. App. 45.
The court declared that "I don't know any way to enforce the
prior orders of the Court but one way," which was to sentence him to imprisonment. Ibid.
The focus of the court's concern, then, was that the petitioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, and
for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to
pay the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate.
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he
could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for
the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or
extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison
sentence.
We do not suggest by our analysis of the present record
that the State may not place the petitioner in prison. If,
upon remand, the Georgia co1,1rts determine that petitioner
did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or de'

2

See cases cited at n. 5, supra.
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termine that alternate punishment is not adequate to meet
the State's interests in punishment and deterrence, imprisonment would be a permissible sentence. Unless such determinations are made, however, fundamental fairness requires
that the petitioner remain on probation.
IV
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered .
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OF GEORGIA
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JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
We deal here with the recurring situation where a person
is convicted under a statute that authorizes fines or imprisonment or both, as well as probation. The defendant is then
fined and placed on probation, one of the conditions of which
is that he pay the fine and make restitution. In such a situation, the Court takes as a given that the state has decided
that imprisonment is inappropriate because it is unnecessary
to achieve its penal objectives. But that is true only if the
defendant pays the fine and makes restitution and thereby
suffers the financial penalty that such payment entails. Had
the sentencing judge been quite sure that the defendant
could not pay the fine, I cannot believe that the court would
not have imposed some jail time or that either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution would prevent such imposition.
Poverty does not insulate those who break the law from
punishment. When probation is revoked for failure to pay a
fine, I find nothing in the Constitution to prevent the trial
court from revoking probation and imposing a term of imprisonment if revocation does not automatically result in the imposition of a long jail term and if the sentencing court makes
a good-faith effort to impose a jail sentence that in terms of
the state's sentencing objectives will be roughly equivalent to
the fine and restitution that the defendant failed to pay. See
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Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 284-287 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting).
The Court holds, however, that if a probationer cannot pay
the fine for reasons not of his own fault, the sentencing court
must at least consider alternative measures of punishment
other than imprisonment, and may imprison the probationer
only if the alternative measures are deemed inadequate to
meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence.
Ante, at 12. There is no support in our cases or, in my view,
the Constitution, for this novel requirement.
In this case, however, the state court did not appear to find
that the prison term imprevef:i was "a rational and necessary
trade-off to punish the individual who possessed no accumulated assets", Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 265 (Harlan, J., concurring). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment .
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JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
We deal here with the recurring situation where a person
is convicted under a statute that authorizes fines or imprisonment or both, as well as probation. The defendant is then
fined and placed on probation, one of the conditions of which
is that he pay the fine and make restitution. In such a situation, the Court takes as a given that the state has decided
that imprisonment is inappropriate because it is unnecessary
to achieve its penal objectives. But that is true only if the
defendant pays the fine and makes restitution and thereby
suffers the financial penalty that such payment entails. Had
the sentencing judge been quite sure that the defendant
could not pay the fine, I cannot believe that the court would
not have imposed some jail time or that either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution would prevent such imposition.
Poverty does not insulate those who break the law from
punishment. When probation is revoked for failure to pay a
fine, I find nothing in the Constitution to prevent the trial
court from revoking probation and imposing a term of imprisonment if revocation does not automatically result in the imposition of a long jail term and if the sentencing court makes
a good-faith effort to impose a jail sentence that in terms of
the state's sentencing objectives will be roughly equivalent to
the fine and restitution that the defendant failed to pay. See
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Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 284-287 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting).
The Court holds, however, that if a probationer cannot pay
the fine for reasons not of his own fault, the sentencing court
must at least consider alternative measures of punishment
other than imprisonment, and may imprison the probationer
only if the alternative measures are deemed inadequate to
meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence.
Ante, at 12. There is no support in our cases or, in my view,
the Constitution, for this novel requirement.
In this case, however, the state court did not appear to find
that the prison term im~I=Q'q~Q was "a rational and necessary
trade-off to punish the individual who possessed no accumulated assets", Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 265 (Harlan, J., concurring). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
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Dear Sandra:
Because I was the only person voting to affirm at
Conference, I have stayed out of the exchanges among the
colleagues on this case up to now.
As I understand your present circulation of May 11th,
when an indigent probationer fails to . pay a fine imposed as
a condition of probation, the court may impose a prison term
if it finds that the indigent could have paid the fine or
made more effort than he has to obtain the means to pay it.
But if the probationer has done everything he could along
this line, the court may imprison him only if it has
"determined that alternatives to imprisonment are not
adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's
interest in punishment and deterrence."
I find it hard to spell out such a requirement from the
Constitution, and in this respect agree with what I take to
be the sense of Lewis' letter of May 2nd, and Byron's letter
of May 9th: When the probationer fails to pay the fine, the
trial court should make "a good-faith effort to impose a
jail sentence that in terms of the State's sentencing
objectives will be roughly equivalent to the fine and
restitution that the defendant failed to pay." BRW letter
of May 9th. But beyond the consideration of alternatives
necessarily involved in that decision, I would not require
separate findings, review, and the like. As presently
advised, I think I prefer Byron's view to the one expresse
in your present draft.
Sincerely
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DANNY R. BEARDEN, PETITIONER v. GEORGIA
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GEORGIA
[May - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution.
Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the acceptability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant factors
when determining an appropriate sentence for an individual
and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant solely because of his lack of financial resources. We conclude that the
trial court erred in automatically revoking probation because
petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that
petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or
that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Court of
Appeals upholding the revocation of probation, and remand
for a new sentencing determination.

I
In September 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies
of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pursuant to the Georgia First Offender's Act, Ga. Code. Ann.
§§ 27-2727 et seq. (current version at §§ 42-8-60 et seq. (1982
Supp.)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of guilt, but
deferred further proceedings and sentenced petitioner to
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three years on probation for the burglary charge and a concurrent one year on probation for the theft charge. As a
condition of probation, the trial court ordered petitioner to
pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. 1 Petitioner was to
pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the $550 balance
within four months.
Petitioner borrowed money from his parents and paid the
first $200. About a month later, however, petitioner was
laid off from his job. Petitioner, who has only a ninth grade
education and cannot read, tried repeatedly to find other
work but was unable to do so. The record indicates that petitioner had no income or assets during this period.
Shortly before the balance of the fine and restitution came
due in February 1981, petitioner notified the probation office
he was going to be late with his payment because he could not
find a job. In May 1981, the State filed a petition in the trial
court to revoke petitioner's probation because he had not
paid the balance. 2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court revoked probation for failure to pay the balance of the
fine and restitution, 3 entered a conviction and sentenced pe1
The trial court ordered a payment of $200 restitution for the theft by
receiving charge; and ordered payment of $50 in restitution and $500 fine
for the burglary charge.
The other conditions of probation prohibited petitioner from leaving the
jurisdiction of the court without permission, from drinking alcoholic beverages, using or possessing narcotics, or visiting places where alcoholic beverages or narcotics are sold, from keeping company with persons of bad
reputation, from violating any penal law; and required him to avoid places
of disreputable character, to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar
as possible, and to report to the probation officer as directed and to permit
the probation officer to visit him.
2
The State's petition alleged two grounds for revoking probation: petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution, and an alleged burglary he
committed on May 10, 1981. The State abandoned the latter ground at the
hearing to revoke probation, and counsel has informed us that petitioner
was later acquitted of the charge. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 1.
3
The trial court also found that petitioner violated the conditions of pro-

81-663~0PINION

BEARDEN v. GEORGIA

3

titioner to serve the remaining portion of the probationary
period in prison. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals, relying on
earlier Georgia Supreme Court cases, 5 rejected petitioner's
claim that imprisoning him for inability to pay the fine violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. Since
other courts have held that revoking the probation of indigents for failure to pay fines does violate the Equal Protection Clause, 6 we granted certiorari to resolve this important
issue in the administration of criminal justice. 458 U. S.
(1981).
II
This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system. Over a quarter-century ago, Justice Black declared that "there can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12,
19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Griffin's principle of "equal
justice," which the Court applied there to strike down a state
bation by failing to report to his probation officer as directed. Since the
trial court was unauthorized under state law to revoke probation on a
ground not stated in the petition, Radcliffv. State, 134 Ga. App. 244, 214
S.E. 2d 179 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the revocation solely on the
basis of petitioner's failure to pay the fine and restitution.
4
The trial court first sentenced petitioner to five years in prison, with a
concurrent three-year sentence for the theft conviction. Since the record
of the initial sentencing hearing failed to reveal that petitioner had been
warned that a violation of probation could result in a longer prison term
than the original probationary period, as required by Stevens v. State, 245
Ga. 835, 268 S.E. 2d 330 (1980), the court reduced the prison term to the
remainder of the probationary period.
5
Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977); Calhoun v.
Couch, 232 Ga. 467, 207 S.E. 2d 455 (1974).
6
See, e. g., Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 (CA5 1972); In re Antazo,
3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P. 2d 999 (1970); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P. 2d
191 (1971); State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A. 2d 137 (1971); State ex
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N. W. 2d 778 (1972).
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practice of granting appellate review only to persons able to
afford a trial transcript, has been applied in numerous other
contexts. See, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1963) (indigent entitled to counsel on first direct appeal);
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (indigent entitled to
free transcript of preliminary hearing for use at trial); Mayer
v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (indigent cannot be denied
an adequate record to appeal a conviction under a fine-only
statute). Most relevant to the issue here is the holding in
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), that a State cannot
subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because
they are too poor to pay the fine. Williams was followed
and extended in Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), which
held that a State cannot convert a fine imposed under a fineonly statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot immediately pay the fine in full. But the
Court has also recognized limits on the principle of protecting
indigents in the criminal justice system. For example, in
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), we held that indigents
had no constitutional right to appointed counsel for a discretionary appeal. In United States v. MacCallum, 426
U. S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion), we rejected an equal protection challenge to a federal statute which permits a district
court to provide an indigent with a free trial transcript only if
the court certifies that the challenge to his conviction is not
frivolous and the transcript is necessary to prepare his
petition.
Due process and equal protection principles converge in
the Court's analysis in these cases. See Griffin v. Illinois,
supra, at 17. Most decisions in this area have rested on an
equal protection framework, although Justice Harlan in particular has insisted that a due process approach more accurately captures the competing concerns. See, e. g., Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 29-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wil-
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liams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 259-266 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). As we recognized in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.,
at 608--609, we generally analyze the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due
Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under
the Equal Protection Clause.
The question presented here is whether a sentencing court
can revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that
the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or
that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate. The
parties, following the framework of Williams and Tate, have
argued the question primarily in terms of equal protection,
and debate vigorously whether strict scrutiny or rational
basis is the appropriate standard of review. There is no
doubt that the State has treated the petitioner differently
from a person who did not fail to pay the imposed fine and
therefore did not violate probation. To determine whether
this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection
Clause, one must determine whether, and under what circumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered
in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is substantially similar to asking directly the due process question
of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary
for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable
to pay the fine. 7 Whether analyzed in terms of equal protec7
We have previously applied considerations of procedural and substantive fairness to probation and parole revocation proceedings. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), where we established certain procedural requirements for parole revocation hearings, we recognized that
society has an "interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness." I d., at
484. We addressed the issue of fundamental fairness more directly in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1972), where we held that in certain
cases "fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require
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tion or due process, 8 the issue cannot be resolved by resort to
easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a
careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... " Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 260
(Harlan, J., concurring).
In analyzing this issue, of course, we do not write on a
clean slate, for both Williams and Tate analyzed similar situations. The reach and limits of their holdings are vital to a
proper resolution of the issue here. In Williams, a defendant was sentenced to the maximum prison term and fine authorized under the statute. Because of his indigency he
could not pay the fine. Pursuant to another statute equating
a $5 fine with a day in jail, the defendant was kept in jail for
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or
parolees." !d., at 790. Fundamental fairness, we determined, presumptively requires counsel when the probationer claims that "there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate." Ibid. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430 (1973), we
found a substantive violation of due process when a state court had revoked
probation with no evidence that the probationer had violated probation.
Today we address whether a court can revoke probation for failure to pay a
fine and restitution when there is no evidence that the petitioner was at
fault in his failure to pay or that alternate means of punishment were
inadequate.
8
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of directly
confronting the intertwined question of the role that a defendant's financial
background can play in determining an appropriate sentence. When the
court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's level of
financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification.
Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting "the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is
a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished," North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723 (1969). The more appropriate question is
whether consideration of a defendant's financial background in setting or
resetting a sentence is so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due
process.
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101 days beyond the maximum prison sentence to "work out"
the fine. The Court struck down the practice, holding that
"[o]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it
may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants
to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum
solely by reason of their indigency." 399 U. S., at 233-234.
In Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971), we faced a similar situation, except that the statutory penalty there permitted only
a fine. Quoting from a concurring opinion in Morris v.
Schoon.field, 399 U. S. 508, 509 (1970), we reasoned that "the
same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a
jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a
person willing and able to pay a fine." 401 U. S., at 398.
The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State cannot "impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then automatically conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." Tate, supra,
at 398. In other words, if the State determines a fine to be
the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may
not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the
resources to pay it. Both Williams and Tate carefully distinguished this substantive limitation on the imprisonment of
indigents from the situation where a defendant was at fault in
failing to pay the fine. As the Court made clear in Williams,
"nothing in our decision today precludes imprisonment for
willful refusal to pay a fine or court costs." 399 U. S., at
242, n. 19. Likewise in Tate, the Court "emphasize[d] that
our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a
fine who refuses or neglects to do so." 401 U. S., at 400.
This distinction, based on the reasons for non-payment, is
of critical importance here. If the probationer has willfully
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refused to pay the fine when he has the means to pay, the
State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. See ALI, Model Penal Code
§ 302.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Similarly, a probationer's failure to make sufficient efforts to seek employment
or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may
reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to
society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment
as an appropriate penalty for the offense. But if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine, and yet
cannot do so through no fault of his own, 9 it is fundamentally
unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available. This lack of fault provides a "substantial reaso[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate(s] the violation and
make revocation inappropriate." Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
supra, at 790. 10 Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 400
9
We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of
fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent a court
from revoking probation. For instance, it may indeed be reckless for a
court to permit a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on
probation once it becomes evident that efforts at controlling his chronic
drunken driving have failed. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968);
Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). Ultimately, it must be remembered that the sentence was not imposed for a circumstance beyond
the probationer's control "but because he had committed a crime." Williams, supra, at 242. In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driving, however, the condition at issue here-indigency-is itself no threat to
the safety or welfare of society.
10
Numerous decisions by state and federal courts have recognized that
basic fairness forbids the revocation of probation when the probationer is
without fault in his failure to pay the fine. For example, in United States
v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 (CA5 1979), the court distinguished between revoking probation where the defendant did not have the resources to pay
restitution and had no way to acquire them-a revocation the court found
improper-from revoking probation where the defendant had the resources to pay or had negligently or deliberately allowed them to be dissipated in a manner that resulted in his inability to pay-an entirely legiti-
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(1978) (POWELL, J., concurring) (distinguishing, under both
due process and equal protection analyses, persons who shirk
their moral and legal obligation to pay child support from
those wholly unable to pay).
The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its
criminal laws. A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes
him from punishment. Thus, when determining initially
whether the State's penological interests require imposition
of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can consider
the entire background of the defendant, including his employment history and financial resources. See Williams v. New
York, 337 U. S. 247, 250, and n. 15 (1949). As we said in
Williams v. Illinois, "[a]fter having taken into consideration
the wide range of factors underlying the exercise of his sentencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from
imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum
penalty prescribed by law." 399 U. S., at 243.
The decision to place the defendant on probation, however,
reflects a determination by the sentencing court that the
State's penological interests do not require imprisonment.
mate action by the trial court. Accord, United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d
339 (CA41965); United States v. Wilson, 469 F . 2d 368 (CA2 1972); State v.
Huggett, 525 P. 2d 1119 (Haw. 1974); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 115-117,
473 P. 2d 999, 1007-1009 (1970); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266
N. W. 2d 403, 408 (1978). Commentators have similarly distinguished between the permissibility of revoking probation for contumacious failure to
pay a fine, and the impermissibility of revoking probation when the probationer made good-faith efforts to pay. See, e. g., ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice 18-7.4 and Commentary (2d ed. 1980) ("incarceration
should be employed only after the court has examined the reasons for nonpayment"); ALI, Model Penal Code§ 302.2 (distinguishing "contumacious"
failure to pay fine from "good faith effort" to obtain funds); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections
§ 5.5 (1973); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act§§ 3-403, 3-404 (1978). See
also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 1304; Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38,
~ 1005-6-4(d).
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See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S., at 264 (Harlan, J., concurring); Woods v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 286-287 (WHITE,
J., dissenting). A probationer's failure to make reasonable
efforts to repay his debt to society may indicate that this
original determination needs reevaluation, and imprisonment
may now be required to satisfy the State's interests. But a
probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay
his fine and restitution, and who has complied with the other
conditions of probation, has demonstrated a willingness to
pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his conduct
to social norms. The State nevertheless asserts three reasons why imprisonment is required to further its penal goals.
First, the State argues that revoking probation furthers its
interest in ensuring that restitution be paid to the victims of
crime. A rule that imprisonment may befall the probationer
who fails to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay restitution may indeed spur probationers to try hard to pay,
thereby increasing the number of probationers who make
restitution. Such a goal is fully served, however, by revoking probation only for persons who have not made sufficient
bona fide efforts to pay. Revoking the probation of someone
who through no fault of his own is unable to make restitution
will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. Indeed,
such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the
probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds to pay in
order to avoid revocation.
Second, the State asserts that its interest in rehabilitating
the probationer and protecting society requires it to remove
him from the temptation of committing other crimes. This is
no more than a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty
by itself indicates he may commit crimes in the future and
thus that society needs for him to be incapacitated. We have
already indicated that a sentencing court can consider a
defendant's employment history and financial resources in
setting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a necessary part of evaluating the entire background of the de-
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fendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the defendant and crime. But it must remembered that the State
is seeking here to use as the sole justification for imprisonment the poverty of a probationer who, by assumption, has
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to find a job and pay
the fine and whom the State initially thought it unnecessary
to imprison. Given the significant interest of the individual
in remaining on probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U. S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972),
the State cannot justify incarcerating a probationer who has
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt to
society, solely by lumping him together with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as dangerous. 11 This would
be little more than punishing a person for his poverty.
Third, and most plausibly, the State argues that its interests in punishing the lawbreaker and deterring others from
criminal behavior require it to revoke probation for failure to
pay a fine or restitution. The State clearly has an interest in
punishment and deterrence, but this interest can often be
served fully by alternative means. As we said in Williams,
399 U. S., at 244, and reiterated in Tate, 401 U. S., at 399,
"[t]he State is not powerless to enforce judgments against
those financially unable to pay a fine." For example, the
sentencing court could extend the time for making payments,
or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform
some form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine. Justice Harlan appropriately observed in his concurring opinion
in Williams that "the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to derive more from its pinch on the purse than the time of payment." Ibid., at 265. Indeed, given the general flexibility
of tailoring fines to the resources of a defendant, or even perThe State emphasizes several empirical studies suggesting a correlation between poverty and crime. E. g., Green, Race, Social Status, and
Criminal Arrest, 35 Amer. Soc. Rev. 476 (1978); M. Wolfgang, R. Figlio,
& T. Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (1972).
11
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mitting the defendant to do specified work to satisfy the fine,
see Williams, supra, at 244, n. 21, a sentencing court can
often establish a reduced fine or alternate public service in
lieu of a fine that adequately serves the State's goals of punishment and deterrence, given the defendant's diminished financial resources. Only if the sentencing court determines
that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest in punishment
and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who
has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient
bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing
authority. If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate
to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence
may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.
Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
As our holding makes clear, we agree with JUSTICE WHITE that poverty does not insulate a criminal defendant from punishment o~cessarily
prevent revocation of his probation for inability to pay a fine . We reject
as impractical, however, the approach suggested by JUSTICE WHITE. He
would require a "good-faith effort" by the sentencing court to impose a
term of imprisonment that is "roughly equivalent" to the fine and restitution that the defendant failed to pay. Post, at 1. Even putting to one
side the question of judicial "good faith," we perceive no meaningful stand12

·'
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III
We return to the facts of this case. At the parole revocation hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified about their
lack of income and assets and of his repeated efforts to obtain
work. While the sentencing court commented on the availability of odd jobs such as lawn-mowing, it made no finding
that the petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to
find work, and the record as it presently stands would not
justify such a finding. This lack of findings is understandable, of course, for under the rulings of the Georgia Supreme
Court 13 such an inquiry would have been irrelevant to the
constitutionality of revoking probation. The State argues
that the sentencing court determined that the petitioner was
no longer a good probation risk. In the absence of a determination that the petitioner did not make sufficient bona fide
efforts to pay or to obtain employment in order to pay, we
cannot read the opinion of the sentencing court as reflecting
such a finding. Instead, the court curtly rejected counsel's
suggestion that the time for making the payments be extended, saying that "the fallacy in that argument" is that the
petitioner has long known he had to pay the $550 and yet did
not comply with the court's prior order to pay. App. 45.
The court declared that "I don't know any way to enforce the
ard by which a sentencing or reviewing court could assess whether a given
prison sentence has an equivalent sting to the original fine. For that reason, we hold that the sentencing court must focus on criteria typically considered daily by sentencing courts throughout the land in probation revocation hearings: whether the defendant has demonstrated sufficient efforts to
comply with the terms of probation and whether non-imprisonment alternatives are adequate to satisfy the State's interests in punishment and deterrence. Nor is our requirement that the sentencing court consider alternative forms of punishment a "novel" requirement. In both Williams and
Tate, the Court emphasized the availability of alternate forms of punishment in holding that indigents could not be subjected automatically to
imprisonment.
13
See cases cited at n. 5, supra.
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prior orders of the Court but one way," which was to sentence him to imprisonment. Ibid.
The focus of the court's concern, then, was that the petitioner had disobeyed a prior court order to pay the fine, and
for that reason must be imprisoned. But this is no more
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to
pay the fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate.
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he
could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for
the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or
extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine into a prison
sentence.
We do not suggest by our analysis of the present record
that the State may not place the petitioner in prison. If,
upon remand, the Georgia courts determine that petitioner
did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or determine that alternate punishment is not adequate to meet
the State's interests in punishment and deterrence, imprisonment would be a permissible sentence. Unless such determinations are made, however, fundamental fairness requires
that the petitioner remain on probation.
IV
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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